Objectives: To compare a new co-designed, patient incident reporting tool with three established methods of detecting patient safety incidents and identify if the same incidents are recorded across methods. Method: Trained research staff collected data from inpatients in nine wards in one university teaching hospital during their stay. Those classified as patient safety incidents were retained. We then searched for patient safety incidents in the corresponding patient case notes, staff incident reports and reports to the Patient Advice and Liaison Service specific to the study wards. Results: In the nine wards, 329 patients were recruited to the study, of which 77 provided 155 patient reports. From these, 68 patient safety incidents were identified. Eight of these were also identified from case note review, five were also identified in incident reports, and two were also found in the records of a local Patient Advice and Liaison Service. Reports of patients covered a range of events from their immediate environment, involving different health professionals and spanning the entire spectrum of care. Conclusion: Patient safety incidents reported by patients are unlikely to be found through other established methods of incident detection. When hospitalized patients are asked about their care, they can provide a unique perspective on patient safety. Co-designed, real-time reporting could be a helpful addition to existing methods of gathering patient safety intelligence.
Introduction
Following international [1] [2] [3] [4] and UK policy imperatives, 5 patients are now participating in service commissioning and routinely providing retrospective feedback about the quality of services through web-based portals such as NHS Choices in England, and in the USA, the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems. 6 Patients can also report on safety problems specific to their care. 7 Most studies, however, have involved locally designed surveys using pre-defined categories, have failed to gather data from patients while receiving care and, in relation to retrospective reporting, did not consider recall bias. 7 Other existing methods for detecting patient safety incidents (PSIs), such as case note review, 8, 9 and staff incident reporting 10, 11 have well-recognized limitations. These sources of data have been conceived solely through a health professional lens and, as such, are unable to draw upon a patient's entire care experience which can only be provided by patients. 12 Previous studies have demonstrated the unique contribution of patients' perspectives in the understanding of safety performance. [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] These studies also provide a strong argument for incorporating patients' views to capture the context of PSIs and that such data must be sensitively collected through a carefully structured process. However, in those studies, patients have neither been involved in the design process, marginalizing the patient contribution, 18 nor have the researchers collected patient data prior to discharge from hospital, thus increasing the likelihood of recall bias. 19 Our aim was to develop and implement a co-produced reporting tool for hospitalized patients to provide feedback on their safety concerns and compare these data to other routinely collected patient safety data. The objectives were: i) to compare data on safety concerns of patients and experiences captured by a patient incident reporting tool (PIRT), with data collected retrospectively through case note review, staff incident reports and via a Patient Advice and Liaison Service (PALS); ii) to quantify any overlap between these various sources of data; and, iii) discuss the implications for patient involvement and the management of safety.
Method

The PIRT
The PIRT (Box 1) was developed as part of a 15-month co-production process with patients and staff (February 2010-May 2011), described in detail elsewhere. 20 The term 'patient safety incident' was thought by patients and staff to be too obscure for potential participants and might lead to under-reporting. We thus agreed to use the alternative term 'safety concerns and experiences' when collecting patient data. This term would be inclusive of what patients might perceive as events with potential for harm (near misses or close calls) and actual harm events.
Setting and sample
Data collection was carried out between September and November 2011 in a university teaching hospital in northern England. Participants were recruited from three medical, three surgical, two maternity and one children's ward. Wards were purposively selected to ensure a diversity of patients and levels of acuity (illness severity). However, we did not include patients who were unable to speak English, as this required translation of our documents into numerous languages which was not feasible due to time and resource constraints. Data were collected by a team of trained researchers who visited each ward once a day from Monday to Friday. Before approaching patients, a researcher first asked the senior nurses which patients were not able to be approached due to their acuity or lack of capacity to consent. Having consented, patients were asked to report safety concerns using the PIRT form. Data were collected from patients who had experienced and were willing to disclose a concern about their safety and had also completed the Patient Measure of Organisational Safety questionnaire. Patients could also spontaneously approach the researchers if they had a concern. In the children's ward, parents provided proxy consent for the participant (if aged under 18), with the PIRT data usually provided by the parent or guardian, sometimes with input from the child. The categorization was based on an inductive analysis of PIRTS from an earlier pilot study; the four categories of safety concern data, however, played no part in the analysis here.
Review of case notes
We reviewed case notes following discharge for all patients on the study wards who had submitted patient safety concerns. Reviewers were unaware whether the patient had reported a safety concern via the PIRT or not. Reviewers searched for patient safety incidents using a nationally accepted definition: 'any unintended or unexpected incident which could have or did lead to harm for one or more patients receiving NHS care'. 21 The case notes were reviewed for the admission that coincided with the PIRT submission and covered all aspects of care up until the point of discharge. The review process was informed by a holistic case note review, originally used in the Harvard Medical Practice Study 22, 23 and now routinely employed in England. This incorporated two stages. Stage one was carried out by four members of the research team (CC, CR, SM), and if a patient safety incident was identified, a further review was carried out by one of five doctors. The stage one team were registered nurses or an operating department practitioner. Stage two reviewers were blinded to the nature of the PSIs identified in stage one.
Review of staff incident reports
Staff incident reports submitted from the study wards over the period of recruitment, and data were collated and analysed retrospectively via an electronic reporting system.
Review of patients' reports to the PALS
Data from a PALS relating to the participating wards was also sought. PALS is a hospital-based information hub for patients which also receives patient feedback and offers advice about how a patient might complain but is not a complaint service.
Review of patients' reports using the PIRT form
For the patient reports, two reviewers (CR and SM) independently identified any PSIs before forwarding the patient reports which included a PSI to two doctors who were asked to confirm the existence of PSIs. Any disagreements were discussed until consensus was reached. Two reviewers (CR and SM) counted PSIs from all sources and searched across the sources for overlap.
Analysis
To compare the PSI data from the various sources with the patient's reported safety concerns and experiences, we matched dates (where possible) and patient identity through use of a specially created patient identity number that corresponded with the patient's Patient Administration System (PAS) number. CR and SM compared all data sources of patient-reported PSIs and, if there was an agreed overlap between sources, this was recorded.
Results
We approached 372 patients and recruited 329 (88%) of whom 77 provided a combined total of 155 patientreported safety concerns (Table 1) . Three patients' case notes were not obtained, four patients did not give consent to access their case notes and an additional five case notes were not available for review at stage two meaning, 70 case notes were reviewed at stage one and 58 at both stages (online Appendix 1).
Analysis of patient reports revealed a wide range of experiences between wards (Table 1 ) and of patient concerns (Box 2). Patients' observations of their immediate environment often included watching other patients' care; the entire health care team from consultants to cleaners; and the impact of staff activities on safety and quality. Patients appeared especially interested in standards of hygiene and clinicians' lack of attention to detail. The proportion of PSI categories were: general care (40%); care surroundings (25%); communication (16%); medication (15%); and multiple issues (4%). Table 2 shows patient safety incidents that were also evident in other sources of patient safety data. Of the patient-reported safety concerns from the PIRT, 68 were classified as PSIs.
Evidence of reporting PSIs and of patient concerns from multiple sources was limited. Only 11 patientreported concerns were also evident in other sources; of these, four were evident in two or more sources. Case note review yielded 1055 incidents. Staff incident reports and information about safety concerns reported by patients to the PALS generated 24 incidents, with no overlap.
A high number of potential documentation errors were identified as PSIs through case note review. Box 3 shows examples of PSIs judged to be documentation errors. However, this was an exceptionally difficult judgement process. Examples of these are shown in Box 4.
Discussion
Main findings
Patients can make a unique contribution to our understanding of safety, over and above the safety intelligence already gathered within hospitals. Their concerns focus on events that are in close proximity but are unlikely to incorporate observable, physical harm. Such concerns are rarely evident in other forms of safety data, indicating a less than complete picture of patient safety at ward level.
Patient reports reflect their experience and knowledge, many aspects of which may be invisible to clinical staff. 24 It would appear patients have seen how care is given by the healthcare team, the differing approaches to the care of their fellow patients, and the various consequences. Whether patients were reporting concerns about their own care or that of others, the content The maternity ward 1 only admitted short stay patients.
Box 2. Examples of patient-reported concerns that were not evident in any other data sources; those asterisked were also judged to be PSIs.
'Before seeing the neurologist, I was given a fairly confident diagnosis of intracranial pressure based on a CT scan, which caused 24 hours of worry and stress. The neurologist contradicted this and felt it wasn't the case at all. I felt I was given a wrong diagnosis by a non-specialist'. 'I went to the toilet a 7.30 am and there was blood on the toilet seat. When I went again at lunchtime it was still there. I informed one of the nurses after I had visited the toilet at lunchtime about the problem. I observed the cleaners having finished cleaning at around 2 pm'. 'The toilet doesn't flush properly, sometimes you have to wait a long time for it to fill up, the pressure is too low, sometimes you go in and it hasn't been flushed'. 'Nasal cannulae have been on the floor but the nurses have picked them up and used them again on the patient. Patient is using own TCP [liquid antiseptic on sale to the general public] to clean the nasal cannulae'. 'There are 3 doors across the corridor from where my bed is which lead into an area that only staff go into. They bang loudly and constantly, its worse on a night as it keeps me awake, and it makes me jumpy and feeling nervy. 'I haven't got a cupboard for my clothes. My table has been missing for a few days; I have to eat my dinner off my bed'. 'My ex-husband came to see me on the ward; I haven't seen him for some years. He told me told me that he was visiting someone on another ward and a member of staff told him where I was. I didn't want him to know anything about me and I didn't want him visiting me'. *'The porter that took me for a scan did not gel his hands on entering and leaving different departments/wards'. *'Nurse doing medication round dispensed 3 tablets instead of 4. Aspirin was missing. The nurse went and checked, it wasn't prescribed on the drug chart. This is a vital medication for my condition'. *'I was seen in outpatients on Monday, told I was to be admitted on Wednesday. No one picked up that I was on warfarin, which should have been stopped. This has prolonged my stay for 3 days and taken up a bed unnecessarily'.
often reflects the possible precursors or antecedents of future PSIs. These antecedents possess an intrinsic learning value, unlikely to be recorded in either case notes 25 which record clinical information (signs, symptoms and biometric data) or incident report data.
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A good example of this is the hospital porter (Box 2) who apparently did not 'gel his hands' prior to patient contact. However peripheral ancillary staff may be to clinical procedures, they routinely handle numerous patients, within and across wards, and are a potential vector for cross-infection. Conversely, many reports might also be judged by some staff, especially those who conceptualize patient safety in terms of outcomes, to be less valuable and about 'soft issues'. 24 Indeed, some of the examples illustrate that the reports of patients could be described as perception driven and consequently are affected by patients' values or expectations. Furthermore, they can be contentious (see the first report in Box 2). Clinicians may hold a different view of the trustworthiness of patient-reported PSIs 26 ; yet, it is clear that some patients use this novel medium to identify phenomena that paint a vivid picture of safety, including issues that might cause distress or contribute to harm, although not immediate. These patientreported concerns are centred on what has been called the 'whole sequence of care'. 15 As indicated earlier, it is apparent that such phenomena may not be recorded in other sources of patient safety data. [13] [14] [15] 17 There was little overlap between different methods of collecting safety data, with different safety data sources identifying different PSIs. Our findings reflect those elsewhere, which have compared the overlap between staff sources of patient data (e.g. incident reporting and case note review) 10, 27, 28 and also those which have added patient sources of data. 14, 15 We did not find any event that was evident in all data sources and little overlap between sources other than PSIs identified through case note review. Although our findings confirm that case note review is likely to provide the greatest number of PSIs, 10, 27, 28 it may also be an indication of the multidisciplinary detail available in case notes, and the systematic process we applied to the analysis which was uniformly implemented by research staff. The PSIs identified from the second stage case note review included a large number of documentation errors, for which we could not find tangible evidence of patient harm.
The paucity of data from the PALS might reflect poor patient awareness about its existence and purpose and that contacting PALS is something that must be instigated by the patient or their relatives, unlike the PIRT which was brought to the patient and facilitated by staff, who were independent of the hospital.
Limitations
There were several limitations to consider. First, this was a single centre study but one that included a diversity of patients from a wide range of specialties. Second, we were unable to recruit all patients admitted to the study wards which limited the scope of our conclusions. Third, we did not recruit very ill patients or patients who were unable to speak English, which may have excluded a group of patients who are more likely to experience an adverse event. 29 Fourth, patients may well have experienced a PSI after the opportunity to provide data via the PIRT, as patients were only asked on one occasion if they had experienced a PSI. Fifth, even though consented patients were encouraged to approach the research team whenever they visited, it was often difficult to meet with patients. This was especially evident at the end of a hospital stay as they were often occupied with discharge. However, we believe that this should be weighed against the capture of real time data -a unique attribute of this study. Sixth, we did not review the case notes of all patients on the study wards which would have allowed identification of those PSIs not identified as concerns by patients (or at least those who had consented). And finally, it was beyond the scope of this study to examine the impact of observed leadership changes on the number of patients reportingsomething that may warrant investigation elsewhere.
Implications for patient safety and organizational learning
Organizational learning can be enhanced by gathering patient-reported concerns. These concerns might also act as an early warning of forthcoming harm events and, if part of an integrated analysis based on the full range of safety data sources available, shed more light on incident causation.
The first step in realizing any potential is through asking patients the right questions at the right time and having trained, independent personnel to ask these sensitive questions. Our approach was conceived through a process of co-production. 30 Patients and staff agreed on a focus of organizational learning, not individual blame, and the method of data collection was developed with patients and ratified by staff so as to be complementary to their existing means of gathering patient safety intelligence. Patients and staff jointly agreed that such data are best collected while patients are hospitalized. Our inclusion of front-line staff appeared to reduce the intervention being perceived by other staff as a top-down initiative borne out of an institutional drive to unconditionally prioritize the patient voice.
However, a further step in realizing the potential of patients' reports is involving them and staff in the analysis and the use of this knowledge in risk management. 31 This is a considerable challenge. Furthermore, a national research institution funded the study described here, which meant no cost was incurred by the host hospital. In the current financial climate, it is hard to foresee many healthcare organizations being able to implement such an initiative without additional finance, technological data-gathering solutions, or the involvement of trained hospital volunteers. The latter two of these possibilities has been explored in a subsequently funded project, examining the role of volunteers in gathering data using a mobile application developed for use on computer tablets. 32 Despite the challenges, we believe there is a valuable opportunity for healthcare policy-makers to encourage provider organizations to directly capture the patient voice for patient safety. Judicious use of this tool, perhaps for one day, once a month with a cross-section of patients, rotating around different wards, could be appealing to pressurized staff and budget-holders. The advantages of patient involvement are becoming clear; it is also apparent that patients want to be open about problems in their care. 16 We also know from our larger study of which this was a part, 33 that patients can equally comment on the presence as well as the absence of safety -the type of information that should be shared with external regulators who may be inclined to prioritize evidence of errors or harm to the neglect of safe practice.
